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lncorporatin$ Social
Science into Criminal
Defense Practice

I

n recent decades, social scientists have created a treas
ure trove of empirical and sociological data that
defenders can and should use to help their clients.
Evidence rules, criminal Jaw, and criminal procedure are
filled with concepts informed by social science. When is
evidence likely to unfairly prejudice a defendant in the
eyes of a jury? Do police interact differently with mem
bers of minority populations and how should that
inform concepts of reasonableness? How easy or difficult
is it for people to identify individuals they see during
high-stress criminal episodes? How effective are police
interrogation tactics at getting at the truth versus getting
suspects to say whatever the interrogator wants to hear?
Courts have also shown more willingness in recent
years to incorporate social science data into their deci
sionmaking on criminal justice issues. Perhaps the most
prominent example is in juvenile adjudications. Studies
on juvenile brain development were an integral part of
the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v . Alabama' ban
ning automatic life without parole for juveniles as cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Lower courts
have also relied on social science data to inform the role
that a suspect's race should play in Fourth Amendment

inquiries. For example, in Commonwealth v. Warren,' the
Massachusetts high court relied on data about racial pro
filing in Boston to discount the relevance of a suspect's
flight in the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether
there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop. More
recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
social science data about racial profiling in Seattle should
similarly "inform the inferences to be drawn from an
individual who decides to step away, run, or flee from
police without a clear reason to do otherwise:•, And many
lower courts have considered social science research when
making decisions about whether to admit forensic sci
ence, eyewitness identifications, and confessions.
These are just a few of the many possible ways that
defense attorneys can leverage social science to help their
clients. So how does a defense attorney find and harness
this data to help clients? And what are the evidentiary
and legal tools that defense lawyers can use to incorpo•
rate social science into their practice? There are a num
ber of ways to learn about relevant social science
research. The National Academy of Sciences,' Rand
Corporation,' Sentencing Project,• and Pew Research
Center1 have websites where they collect and publish
reports relevant to criminal law and criminal justice.
And many legal scholars are now writing law review arti
cles, blogging, or posting social science research on social
media. Just as defense attorneys search for precedent
when thinking about how to craft their legal arguments,
so too should they search for helpful social science.
Once relevant social science research is located,
there are a number of possible ways that a defense attor
ney can incorporate that research into her criminal
defense practice. They include motions in limine,
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motions to suppress, voir dire, requests
for judicial notice, stipulations, expert
witnesses, questioning of witnesses,
arguments to the factfinder, requests for
additional jury instructions, and sen
tencing advocacy/plea negotiations.
Which vehicle is the most appropriate
for bringing social science into the
courtroom will depend on the issue, the
client, the case strategy, and the court.
Motions in Limine

Defenders should use social science
to support motions in limine to exclude
evidence as unfairly prejudicial, to pro
hibit testimony that relies on impermis
sible character inferences or improper
hearsay, and to exclude junk science.
A.

Unfair Prejudice

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
relevant evidence can be excluded if its
probative value is substantially out
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of tin1e, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. Defenders should
use social science studies to inform courts
about when a defendant is likely to be
unfairly prejudiced by the admission of
evidence and when a jury might be misled
or confused by certain evidence.
For example, defenders should
deploy the same research that led courts
to discount flight by African Americans
in the reasonable suspicion analysis t o
make arguments that evidence of flight
is unfairly prejudicial if admitted to
show consciousness of guilt. Jurors will
assume that the defendant was fleeing
because he is guilty when, in reality,
members of racial minorities have other
reasons why they might flee. Even if the
judge does not preclude the evidence
under 403, the judge might permit
defense counsel to bring in social science
evidence to rebut the argument that
consciousness of guilt is the only reason
for the flight or permit an additional
jury instruction on the issue.
Creative defenders have relied on
social science to try to prevent prosecu
tors from referring to a complaining
witness as a "victim" or to prevent the
phrase "domestic violence" from being
said in front of the jury. When there is
research that a certain word or phrase is
likely to evoke an emotional response
from jurors and make them stereotype
the defendant or want to punish
regardless of the defendant's guilt,
defenders should use that research to
prevent the unfairly prejudicial terms
from coming into their clients' trials.
NACDL.ORG

Social science research can also help
defenders think about when limiting
instructions are effective and when they
do not work. This is particularly impor
tant for defense attorneys who are trying
to exclude evidence as unfairly prejudi
cial. The ineffectiveness of limiting
instructions is relevant when conducting
the balancing required under Federal
Rules of Evidence 403. In the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 403, the
drafters emphasized that, "[i]n reaching
a decision whether to exclude on
grounds of unfair prejudice, considera
tion should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a
limiting instruction."
There are social science studies
demonstrating that limiting instruc
tions are ineffective in a number of
contexts. For example, in one study,
participants admitted openly that they
used a prior conviction of the defen
dant to determine his guilt even
though they were specifically instruct
ed to consider it only for determining
his truthfulness.� Defenders should use
social science studies like these to but
tress arguments to exclude such evi
dence as unfairly prejudicial.
B.

Character Evidence

Social science evidence can also
inform defense motions in limine to
exclude problematic character evidence.
Two researchers published the results of
a study in 2009 in which they used data
from over 300 criminal trials in three
large counties (Los Angeles, Phoenix,
a.nd the Bronx) and Washington, D.C., to
study the effect of the admission of a
defendant's criminal record on jury
decisionmaking. They found that juror
knowledge of a defendant's prior crimi
nal history is significantly associated
with conviction in weak cases and not
significantly associated with conviction
in strong cases. In weak cases, the pres
ence of a criminal record increases the
probability of conviction from less than
20 percent to about 50 percent or greater
based not on the evidence presented but
on the inference of bad character from
the admission of the prior convictions!
Defenders should use this study to argue
that the admission of a client's prior
criminal record is particularly likely to
unfairly prejudice the factfinder in weak
or circumstantial cases and should be
excluded for that reason.
Whenever prior convictions of vio
lence are offered against an African
American male defendant, defense
attorneys should cite social science
about improper societal stereotypes

associating African American men with
violence'• to argue that the unfair preju
dice to an African American man is
actually higher than it is for a similarly
situated white man and should be con
sidered as part of the balancing under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
More generally, there are a number
of studies questioning the entire premise
of the admission of character evidence
- namely, the idea that people have cer
tain "traits" that determine their behav
ior. Instead, research tends to show "that
behavior is largely shaped by specific sit
uational determinants that do not lend
themselves easily to predictions about
individual behavior." 11 This research
could supplement a motion to exclude a
prior conviction or bad act that is older
or happened under extenuating circum
stances but is offered by the government
for a permissible character purpose. In
such situations, the research suggests
that the person is not likely to repeat the
behavior in a different situation and
thus the probative value of the prior act
is markedly lower. Alternatively, when
such prior acts are admitted, defenders
can try to bring up evidence about these
developments in character theory to try
and minimize the impact of the prior
bad acts testimony.
More particularly, there is research
suggesting that it is problematic to admit
prior convictions solely to impeach a
defendant's credibility. According to one
empirical study, using prior convictions to
assess a defendant's credibility does not
work. "The defendant's credibility is
already so much lower than that of the
other witnesses (because it obviously is in
the defendant's self-interest to give testi
mony which favors his or her position)
that the admission of prior convictions
does not reduce the credibility of the
defendant further." 12 Thus, the social sci
ence suggests that the probative value of
this evidence as a tool for assessing credi
bility is quite low. At the same time, the
same research reveals that the danger of
unfair prejudice to the defense is incredi
bly high. Conviction rates varied as a
function of the admission of the prior
record and "the subjects were willing to
state that the prior conviction evidence
increased the likelihood of the defendant's
guilt and was the reason they found him
guilty, even though they had been
instructed not to use the information for
that purpose."'·' Defenders can use studies
like these in motions in limine to try to
prevent the prosecution from using prior
convictions for impeachment purposes or
to try to get better jury instructions when
prior convictions are admitted.
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C.

Hearsay Testimony

Social science evidence can also be
used to challenge the admission of cer
tain kinds of hearsay evidence by chip
ping away at the underlying premise
behind certain hearsay exceptions that
the statements given are reliable.
Consider, for example, this excerpt from
an article by Bryan Liang describing just
how unreliable dying declarations are:
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Epidemiologically, in the
United States, penetrating trau
ma, such as [that] induced by
gunshots and knives, is involved
in greater than 80 percent of all
homicides . . . . The primary
cause of death when patients
are injured by penetrating trau
ma is uncontrolled hemorrhage
.... [U]ncontrolled hemorrhage
results in a concomitant inter
ruption of oxygen flow to neu
ral tissues [and] will quickly
lead to hypoxic or anoxic insult
to the victim's brain ....
One area that has been studied
is the effect on cognition of
experimentally induced hypox
ia through acute simulated
changes in altitude. In this con
text, there is overwhelming evi
dence that hypoxic changes sig
nificantly and negatively affect
cognition. First, for healthy
males aged 23 to 31 at simulat
ed high altitudes ... and absent
any other stresses . . . mental
functions ... degraded, partic
ularly global functions [such
as] intelligence, reasoning, and
short-term memory. Others
have reported that similarly
induced hypoxia produces sig
nificant effects upon learning,
vigilance, psychomotricity, and
intellectual abilities ....
In addition, hypoxic and anox
ic states due to impaired blood
flow or trauma can result in
delirium .... Traditional fea
tures of delirium include sig
nificant global disorders of the
patient's cognitive functions . . . .
Delusions, usually persecutory,
are often, but not invariably,
present
Memory is
impaired in all its key aspects.
... [A]n extremely wide range
of misperceptions of reality
and de novo hallucinatory per
ceptions, including mistaken
identity, can occur when an
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individual is in a state of deliri
um secondary to hypoxia ...."
If defense counsel has a trial in
which the prosecution's case depends on
the admission of a dying declaration,
this research might be useful in trying to
keep out the hearsay statement as unfair
ly prejudicial and unreliable under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
D. Junk Science

Social science research also should
inform motions to exclude junk sci
ence under Daubert or its state coun
terpart.,s Even when the court is not
inclined to exclude the evidence alto
gether, defenders should use social sci
ence to limit the damaging impact of
forensic testimony. For example,
scholars have argued and some courts
have agreed that experts' testimony
should be limited so they do not testify
in the language of absolute certainty.••
Additionally, some courts have been
receptive to defense arguments that it
would unfairly prejudice the defense if
government witnesses who testify to
forensic conclusions were called
"experts" because cloaking them as
experts can unfairly sway the jury.
In fact, in its Note to the 2000
Amendment to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, the Advisory Committee
wrote that "there is much to be said for
a practice that prohibits the use of the
term 'expert' by both the parties and
the court at trial. Such a practice
'ensures that trial courts do not inad
vertently put their stamp o f authority'
on a witness's opinion and protects
against the jury's being 'overwhelmed
by the so-called 'experts."''$
17

Motions to Suppress

Social science should also inform
motions to suppress eyewitness identifica
tions, confessions, and evidence obtained
as a result of impermissible searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
A.

EyewitnessIdentifications

Social science research has identi
fied two categories of variables that con
tribute to the well-recognized problem
of mistaken identifications - estimator
variables and system variables.,.
Estimator variables are factors over
which the legal system has no control
and include the characteristics of the
witness, the characteristics of the perpe
trator, and the circumstances of the wit
nessed event. Some people are better at
being witnesses than others. Young chil
dren and the elderly are less able to make

accurate identifications than young
adults, and sober individuals are better
at making accurate identifications than
those who are intoxicated. The charac
teristics of the suspect can also affect the
reliability of an identification. Research
reveals that the use of disguises including hats, sunglasses, masks, and
wigs - severely inhibits witnesses' abili
ties to later identify someone. There is
also robust research documenting prob
lems with cross-racial identifications.
People have a much harder time identi
fying the facial features and distinguish
ing among people of a different race.
The circumstances surrounding
an event can also affect the reliability
of an identification. A brief or fleeting
exposure to a suspect is less likely to
produce an accurate identification
than a prolonged one. An identifica
tion made at a great distance or in bad
lighting conditions is more likely to be
inaccurate than one made up close
with good lighting. Research has
shown that witnesses are particularly
bad at identifying suspects who have
used weapons to commit their crimes
due to a phenomenon known as
"weapon focus." Witnesses focus on
the weapon itself rather than focusing
on the person holding it. And studies
reveal that high levels of stress can
diminish an eyewitness's ability to
recall details and make an accurate
identification later.
System variables are factors - like
identification procedures - that are
within the legal system's control.
Witnesses are very susceptible to sugges
tion. A police officer's subtle comment
or action can affect a witness's selec
tions, and police comments made after
an identification praising or congratu
lating the witness can improperly rein
force a shaky identification and engen
der a false sense of confidence.
The composition of the lineup or
photo array can also be suggestive.
Sometimes, if a witness does not select
the suspect out of a photo array, the
police will then conduct a live lineup in
order to get the witness to make an
identification. Research on the
"mugshot exposure effect" reveals that
presenting a suspect to the witness mul
tiple times increases the likelihood that
the witness's later identification of the
suspect is based on her memory of hav
ing seen the earlier photograph rather
than her memory of the crime itself.
Witnesses are often anxious to make an
identification and naturally believe that
the culprit is in the lineup or photo
spread. As a result, they will frequently
THE CHAMPION
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identify the person who most resembles
the witnesses' memory relative to other
people in the lineup or photospread. If
the suspect is the only person in the
lineup or photospread that fits the gen
eral description of the perpetrator, wit
nesses will pick the suspect because they
want to be helpful and he looks most
like their memory of the perpetrator.
Moreover, once the witness makes a
selection, she becomes committed to the
identification and will psychologically
reinforce her choice.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, an out-of-court
eyewitness identification must be
excluded if the police-orchestrated eye
witness identification procedures used
to obtain the identification were unnec
essarily suggestive and create a serious
risk of a mistaken identification. Police
failure to abide by best practices often
leads to suggestive identification proce
dures, and all of this social science
informs the ultimate reliability (or lack
thereof) of a resulting identification.20
Defenders should also use this
social science data to argue for greater
protections under state law. Some states
rely on evidence rules to circumscribe
the admissibility of unreliable identifica
tions." Still others have adopted require
ments that more severely restrict the
admissibility of one-person show up
The
identification
procedures-22
Connecticut Supreme Court relied on
social science data about the problems

now know relied on false confessions to
identify a number of interrogation
techniques that are significantly corre
lated with false confessions. These t a c 
tics include lengthy interrogations,2'
feeding the suspect key details that only
the perpetrator could have known and
then relying on those details when they
are incorporated into the later contam
inated confession to demonstrate the
confession's reliability,2' direct promises
of lenient treatment if the suspect con
fesses,2• indirect promises of lenient
treatment through minimization tech
niques/; threats of harsh consequences
if the suspect refuses to confess, 28 false
evidence ploys that make it appear that
the police can already conclusively
establish the suspect's guilt,19 and lead
ing or suggestive questioning of vulner
able populations (juveniles, mentally
disabled people, and the mentally ill).'0
When police use these tactics, criminal
defense attorneys should rely on social
science in their motions to suppress the
resulting confessions as involuntary
and in their motions to exclude the
confessions as unreliable under evi
dence principles."
C.

Fourth Amendment Challenges

For decades, scholars have been
arguing that the dynamics surrounding
ari .encounter between a police officer
and a Black male are different from
those surrounding an encounter
between an officer and the so-called rea-

When is evidence lil<ely to prejudice
a defendant in the eyes of a jury? Do police
interact differently with members of different
populations? I-low difficult is it for people to
identify individuals they see during high•
criminal episodes? These questions are all
informed by social scienc� concepts.
, . i,

with suggestive identification proce
dures to hold that first-time, in-court
identifications are not admissible in
cases when identity is an issue.2'
Defenders can build on this precedent
and use social science to exclude prob
lematic eyewitness identifications under
both federal or state law.
B.

Confessions

In the last 20 years, empmc1sts,
criminologists, and psychologists have
studied wrongful convictions that we
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sonable person.32 Whether a person is
stopped versus merely accosted under
the Fourth Amendment turns on the
question of whether a reasonable person
in the individual's shoes would feel free
to disregard the police and leave or end
the encounter. But whether a reasonable
person feels free to leave an inquiring
police officer is about power dynamics,
and those dynamics are different for
racial minorities in this country. The
ACLU of New Hampshire filed an ami
cus brief in 20 I 9 in a Fourth

Amendment case collecting social sci
ence data to argue that race should be
considered when determining whether it
was reasonable to think that a person
could disregard the police and end an
encounter.33 Defenders should rely on
the national data in this motion, as well
as social science data specific to their
respective jurisdictions, to argue for
individualization of the reasonable p e r 
son standard to consider race i n Fourth
Amendment inquiries.
Similarly, defenders should rely on
research about implicit biases to argue
that officers are more likely to code
minority community members as
"dangerous," "aggressive," "violent,"
and "criminal."" If courts are going to
look at officer behavior through a lens
of deference to officer experience,35
perhaps those same courts should look
at officer behavior involving interac
tions with minority community mem
bers through a lens that considers how
police officers' implicit biases may
have affected their actions. For exam
ple, when searches and seizures are
supported by ambiguous suspect
behaviors like nervousness or furtive
movements, defenders should ask
courts to consider whether implicit
biases may have affected the officers'
perceptions such that those factors
should be discounted in the reasonable
suspicion or probable cause analyses
in the same way that flight by African
American men is now discounted in
the reasonable suspicion analyses in
Boston and Seattle.

Voir Dire
Before voir dire begins, defense
attorneys should consult social science
to craft effective questions for juror
questionnaires. Individuals are often
more willing to disclose personal infor
mation and experiences in written form
than orally in a public courtroom. Social
science can inform defense lawyers
about how to write questions that will
effectively encourage potential jurors to
reveal implicit biases and attitudes.
The jury selection process itself
then gives defense counsel a wonderful
opportunity to educate prospective
jurors about social science concepts
that are important to the theory of
defense. For example, some judges
have been willing to play a video to
prospective jurors showing stark dif 
ferences in how a Black man, a white
man, and an attractive white female
are treated when passersby see them
attempting to steal a bicycle in broad
daylight in a park..1• The video is then
TH E CHAM P I ON

used as a springboard for voir dire
questioning about implicit biases.
Defenders could use other videos
like the invisible gorilla studyl' to
introduce prospective jurors to the
problems of selective attention in eye
witness identifications. In the invisible
gorilla video, viewers are told to count
how many times people wearing white
shirts pass a basketball back and forth.
There are also people wearing black
shirts who are passing another ball on
the screen at the same time, but viewers
are told not to count those passes. In
the middle of the video, a person in a
black gorilla suit walks through,
pounds his chest, and walks off. The
gorilla is present on the screen for nine
seconds before leaving, but 50 percent
of the people who watch this video do
not notice the gorilla because their
attention is focused elsewhere. This
counterintuitive example of how peo
ple often do not see seemingly impor
tant and salient things when they are
focused on other things is a great start
ing point for a broader discussion
about the problems with eyewitness
identification testimony.
Even without videos, defenders may
want to introduce social science research
at the voir dire stage and use it to discuss
important concepts with prospective
jurors, both to sensitize prospective
jurors to the ideas before the evidence is
presented and to figure out which jurors
are not receptive to important compo•
nents of the defense theory of the case.
Judicial Notice
Judicial notice is an underused
defense tool. Federal Rule of Evidence
20 I permits a court to take judicial
notice of facts that are not subject to
reasonable dispute either because they
are generally known within the territo
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or
because they are capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot rea
sonably be questioned. Defense attor
neys should ask courts to take judicial
notice of relevant statistics and social
science research.
Requests for judicial notice can be
made at any point in the proceedings.
This means that a defense attorney who
is cross-examining a police officer
about a stop that the officer made could
pause and ask the court to take judicial
notice of statistics about the rate at
which African American men are
stopped as compared to white men in
that jurisdiction. Once defense counsel
requests judicial notice, Federal Rule of
NACDL.ORG

Evidence 20 l (c) requires the court to
take judicial notice of the requested
fact(s) if the court is supplied with the
necessary information to support the
request. Even better, Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 (f) requires the court t o
inform the jury that i t may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed. Defense counsel
can then incorporate the judicially
noticed fact(s) into her questioning and
arguments to the factfinder.
Judicial notice is an opportunity for
defenders to incorporate well-known
statistics and social science principles
into a trial or hearing without having to
call expert witnesses. There are, o f
course, times when calling the expert is
advisable either because the court will
not take judicial notice of the requested
fact(s) or because an expert would be
helpful to explain their significance. But
judicial notice, when used effectively,
can infuse the defense attorney's ques
tioning and arguments with expertise
and scientific support in ways that res
onate with judges and juries.
Stipulations
Sometimes defense counsel can get
a prosecutor to stipulate to statistics or
social science results that will be useful
in later arguments (either to the court or
to the jury). This may occur rarely, but is
very useful when it happens.
Experts
In some circumstances, defense
counsel may want to present a defense
expert to e>..-plain important social sci
ence concepts to the judge or jury.
Experts are often necessary when
defenders file pretrial motions in limine
to exclude junk science. But experts can
also be helpful at other points. For
example, the National Academy of
Sciences recommends that judges allow
social science experts to testify at trials
involving eyewitness identifications to
explain the frailty and fallibility of eye
witness testimony:"" And defense attor
neys have used experts to discuss how
certain interrogation tactics can lead to
false confessions as part of motions to
suppress statements.
Defense counsel should also consid
er using social science to make the case
for state-funded expert assistance. In
some jurisdictions, the defense has to
make a showing that denial of expert
assistance would result in a fundamen
tally unfair trial in order to get a court
funded expert." To the extent that there
is social science indicating how persua
sive certain expert evidence is to jurors,

the argument that denial of such assis
tance to the defense would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial is stronger.
Cross-Examination and
Arguments to the Factfinder
Defense attorneys should also think
about incorporating social science into
their cross-examinations and arguments
to the factfinder. For example, if the pros
ecution offers evidence of flight by an
African American male suspect, defense
counsel can craft a cross-examination
highlighting the research documenting
innocent reasons African American men
might flee from police and pointing out
that the client is an African American
man. When the court admits junk sci
ence, defense counsel can cross�examine
the prosecution's expert witnesses using
social science data to probe all of the flaws
in that science. During cross-examination
of someone who made an eyewitness
identification, defense counsel can high
light each estimator and system variable
that might suggest a wrongful identifica
tion. And if a confession is being offered
against the defendant and there are inter
rogation tactics that the officer used that
are correlated with false confessions,
defense counsel can cross-examine the
officer about them.
Sometimes incorporating social
science studies into cross-examination
means finding studies in learned trea
tises that defense counsel can admit
under a hearsay exception; sometimes it
means using the studies to impeach an
expert or officer's credibility; and
sometimes it means asking the court to
take judicial notice of the social science
first and then asking a witness about it.
Defenders should use the research that
they bring out during questioning
when making arguments to the
factfinder later about how much weight
to give the testimony or evidence.
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Jury Instructions
Far too often attorneys take pattern
criminal jury instructions as gospel.
They are the only instructions these
attorneys ask for and they do not argue
that the words in the pattern instruc·
tions should be modified. This is a mis·
take. Social science research can inform
when jury instructions are necessary and
how they should be phrased.
For example, a number of states
have pattern jury instructions on eyewit·
ness identification procedures that do
not adequately educate jurors about the
potential reliability problems associated
with eyewitness identification practices.
Courts in some states have been receptive
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to defense requests for enhanced jury
instructions to help jurors accurately
assess the reliability of eyewitness identi
fications.•0 If the prosecution is offering
an eyewitness identification procedure
that was compromised by a problematic
system or estimator variable or involves a
cross-racial identification, defense coun
sel should ask the court for a specific, tai
lored jury instruction explaining the
social science problem and telling the
jurors that they may consider that prob
lem when considering how much weight
to give the identification testimony. The
same is true when the police use prob
lematic interrogation tactics to elicit con
fessions or when they question juveniles,
mentally disabled suspects, or those who
are mentally ill. And if the prosecution is
permitted to admit forensic evidence
that has known error rates, defense coun
sel should ask the judge to instruct the
jurors on those error rates or, at the very
least, to tell the jurors that there have
been errors and that they may consider
that when they consider whether the evi
dence is credible.
Defense coLmsel should also ask
for jury instructions that punish the
government for its failures. If the
police have a policy that they are sup
posed to videotape or record interroga
tions and they fail to do so, defense
counsel should try to suppress the con
fession. If the judge decides to admit it,
the defense should still ask the judge to
give the jury an instruction indicating
that there is a policy in place requiring
the police to record interrogations, that
the government failed to make or pre
serve a recording, and that the govern
ment's failure to produce that record
ing means that the jury may infer that
something unfavorable to the prosecu
tion occurred. In effect, defense coun
sel should ask for a form of a missing
witness instruction. Defense counsel
should also ask for these kinds of
instructions when the police fail to
abide by department policy regarding
how to conduct eyewitness identifica
tions and when they fail to turn on
their body cameras during a police
suspect interaction when department
policy requires recording.
Social science arguments may sup
port requests to change or supplement
existing pattern instructions. Consider,
for example, Michigan Criminal Jury
Instruction 4.4 on flight. That instruc
tion tells jurors that some evidence of
flight has been admitted and instructs
them that "lt]his evidence does not
prove guilt. A person may run or hide for
innocent reasons, such as panic, mistake,
t-l A C D L . O RG

or fear. However, a person may also run
or hide because of a consciousness of
guilt You must decide whether the evi
dence is true, and, if true, whether it
shows that the defendant had a guilty
state of mind." \Nhen flight is offered into
evidence against an African American
man in a community where African
American men have been racially pro
filed and subjected to excessive force,
defense counsel should ask the judge to
add to that jury instruction. The instruc
tion should inform jurors that they have
also heard testimony that the suspect is
an African American male and that there
are reports documenting ways in which
African American men have been sub
jected to racial profiling and excessive
force in the jurisdiction such that African
American men may have an additional
innocent reason for running or hiding
from the police that they can consider.
Social science research also
informs when special jury instructions
are necessary . According to researchers,
too many defense attorneys "blindfold"
jurors by withholding information and
leaving them to fall back on their pre
conceived stereotypes and beliefs about
important issues." Blindfolding occurs
when lawyers try lo withhold certain
evidence from the jury altogether. They
never discuss it, enter it, or give
instructions on it. If the jurors have no
reason to make assumptions or specu
late about an issue, blindfolding can
work. But research shows that when
the jurors have pretrial experiences,
attitudes, or beliefs that provide them
with a foundation of potentially rele
vant information that makes the for
bidden topic likely to come to mind,
blindfolding will fail. Those are situa
tions in which defense counsel should
address the forbidden topic through
instructions (and maybe questioning at
trial or expert witnesses if necessary).
Consider, for example, the defen
dant's right to remain silent. Every juris
diction has a jury instruction informing
jurors that defendants have a constitu
tional right to remain silent and that
their silence should not be used against
them. Jurisdictions use this instruction
because it is common knowledge that
jurors will assume that a defendant who
does not testify is guilty. The instruction
is there because blindfolding and saying
nothing will adversely affect defendants
who assert their constitutional rights.
But this instruction might not go far
enough. It fails to address the underlying
social science problem - namely, that
jurors think innocent people will say
that they are innocent. Perhaps the

instructions should tell jurors that there
are a number of reasons why a defen
dant might choose not to testify that
have nothing to do with whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent of the
charges in this case {similar to the flight
instruction discussed above). The
instruction could even say that defense
attorneys may make recommendations
to their clients about whether to testify
based on legal principles and rules of
evidence that have nothing to do with a
defendant's guilt or innocence on the
current charges. Rather than blindfold
ing the jury as to the reasons a person
might choose not to testify, it might be
helpful to offer a few reasons why inno
cent people might not testify.
Similarly, a defense attorney who
is arguing that her client gave a false
confession should not remain blind to
the social science research that people
think an innocent person would never
confess to a crime that he did not com
mit. Gather the social science and try
to get an instruction from the judge
that educates jurors by telling them
that false confessions happen and that
explains how and why they happen.
Ignoring the jurors' pretrial attitudes
and beliefs will only work to the
client's detriment.
Sentencing Advocacy/
Plea Negotiations

Whether a client's sentence is being
determined by a judge exercising discre
tion during a sentencing hearing or a
prosecutor exercising discretion during
plea negotiations, defenders should rely
on social science to discount potential
aggravating factors and buttress their case
for mitigation. For example, research sug
gests that prior contacts with the police
that did not result in convictions should
not be considered {or at the very least
should be significantly discounted) at sen
tencing for racial minorities due to
implicit bias. In United States v. Mateo
Medina,41 the Third Circuit held that a
federal district court had erred in consid
ering the defendant's bare record of prior
arrests that did not lead to conviction
when imposing a sentence. That court
relied on a Sentencing Project Report and
an empirical study analyzing 13 years'
worth of data on race, socioeconomic fac
tors, drug use, and drug arrests to con
clude that {a) socioeconomic factors
influenced disparities in arrest rates; (b)
police are more likely to stop and arrest
people of color due to implicit bias; and
(c) even though African Americans,
Hispanics, and whites used drugs in
roughly the same percentages and in
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roughly the same ways, African Americans
at age 22 had 83 percent greater odds of a
drug arrest than whites (and at age 27 this
disparity was 235 percent) and socioeco
nomic factors such as residing in an inner
city neighborhood accounted for much of
the disparity in drug arrest rates with
respect to Hispanics. Defenders should
rely on this case and the studies that it
cites to argue that prior police contact
does not merit a higher sentence for
minority community members.
Defenders can also rely o n social sci
ence data to mitigate their clients' actions
at sentencing and argue for shorter prison
sentences or non-jail sentences. For
example, research on brain development
may be helpful when arguing that a juve
nile offender is capable of being rehabili
tated. Defenders may cite studies about
the costs of incarceration, coupled with
information about how people often "age
out" of committing certain kinds of
crime, to argue that longer sentences do
not serve the public interest.•} And social
science research o n the criminogenic
effects of incarceration supports non-jail
sentences for minor offenders.
These are just some of the many
ways that defenders can make effective
and creative use of social science
research to help their clients. Social sci
ence is an important and currently
underused tool in many defenders' arse
nal. It is time for that to change.
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